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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional order, now celebrating its twentieth 
anniversary, is characterized by an abiding tension between a popular, democratically 
elected ruling party—the political system might best be described as a unipolar 
democracy1—and a constitutional promise of democratic accountability. Structurally, 
the responsibility for ensuring this accountability is straddled between Parliament, 
which bears the traditional legislative role of overseeing the executive in addition to 
lawmaking, and a range of independent institutions that emerged from the particular 
history of South Africa’s democratic transition. Furthermore, in South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy, the courts, and the Constitutional Court in particular, are 
charged with determining the allocation of constitutional authority and resolving 
conflicts brought to them as different institutions struggle to ensure that there is 
legal accountability for governmental failures as well as individual malfeasance. The 
goal of this article is to explore the relationship between democracy and accountability 
in this particular context and to argue that what is significant here is the attempt to 
institutionalize a system of checks and balances that neither relies on a strict or 
formal separation of powers nor fragments power to an extent that paralyzes 
governance. Instead, it seeks to provide a constitutional system of governance in 
which there are multiple sites of power and authority to which political and social 
groups in conflict may repeatedly turn in their attempts both to be heard and to 
protect their interests or achieve their often irreconcilable goals.
 Designing a constitution that includes the separation of powers is often described 
as a means to avoid the concentration of power and to “ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”2 in the practice of governance. While the separation of 
powers cannot be found explicitly enshrined in any single provision of the South 
African Constitution—or for that matter in most other constitutions—it is a core 
element in the structural design of the Constitution and is expressed in the multiple 
provisions that create specific checks and balances between the different branches and 
institutions of government.3 Although traditional approaches to the separation of 
powers doctrine focus on the checks and balances between the legislature, executive, 
and judiciary, the problem of political and legal accountability is no longer contained 
within these institutional parameters. Increasingly, constitutional designers have 
created additional mechanisms and institutions in their efforts to ensure the 
achievement of their desired goals of accountability, responsiveness, and openness in 
the exercise of governmental authority. Since the late twentieth century, these new 
institutions have proliferated in new and amended constitutions.
1. I use the term “unipolar” rather than “dominant party” democracy because it is more descriptive of a 
politics in which the democratic majority remains loyal to a broad liberation politics but the main party—
here, the African National Congress (ANC)—in fact represents a number of different political tendencies.
2. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, sched. 4 (VI).
3. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 174 (providing that, when appointing judicial officers, the President 
must consult the Judicial Service Commission and leaders of the parties in the National Assembly); id. 
§ 102(2) (empowering the National Assembly, upon majority approval for a vote of no confidence, to 
require the President’s resignation).
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 The inclusion of a plethora of new constitutional institutions to address 
governmental accountability has direct implications for a conception of the separation 
of powers.4 On the one hand, the existence of these new institutions makes it difficult 
to maintain a very formal conception of the separation of powers as a trilateral system 
of checks and balances between the three traditional branches of government: the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. On the other hand, it also complicates a 
simple functionalist approach in which we distinguish between the making, 
implementing, and interpreting of laws. The task is further complicated by the fact 
that in addition to the different coordinate branches of government, modern 
constitutions, and even some older constitutional orders such as the United States, 
are laden with institutions of governance—such as the Federal Reserve in the United 
States or the Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa—which do not fit neatly into 
either a formalist or functionalist conception of the separation of powers. Instead, 
these different institutions exercise public power relatively independent of the three 
traditional branches, or at least have a degree of constitutionally protected decisional 
autonomy and independence that is at odds with our traditional notions of the 
trilateral structure of government.
 At the same time, the proliferation of new institutions raises important questions 
about their institutional authority and place in the constitutional system. How are 
these institutions supposed to act in the achievement of good governance, and how 
do they fit within the realm of the separation of powers? Whether it is a question of 
appropriate investigative capacities, reporting and prosecutorial functions, or the 
appointment and institutional independence of officials within these institutions, 
their constitutional status and relationship with the other branches or institutions of 
government implicate the allocation and separation of powers within the 
constitutional system. Nowhere has this question been more salient than in South 
Africa, where the implementation of the post-apartheid constitutional order has been 
marked by the foibles of a dominant political party, a complex institutional structure, 
and an active civil society that has sought to use the constitutional framework to hold 
the government accountable.
 A key structural feature of the Constitution is the way in which power is both 
distributed and integrated in a system of governance that is designed not only to avoid 
the paralysis of a rigid separation of powers but also to ensure that there are multiple 
avenues for democratic and legal contestation. This combination of distributed and 
integrated power extends from the system of cooperative government to the allocation 
of constitutional authority between distinct institutions whose task is to ensure that 
essential elements of good governance—clean elections, fiscal integrity, transparent 
procurement, and just administration—are maintained at all levels of government as it 
grapples with the enormous task of addressing the crippling legacies of colonialism and 
4. See Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in Established Democracies (or 
Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn from Sale?), 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 613, 
618 (2014). See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000).
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apartheid. In fact, the Constitutional Assembly5 understood the role of these 
institutional features of the Constitution as key to the commitment to constitutional 
democracy, bringing them together in an innovative and unique fashion in Chapter 9 
as “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy.”6 This is not to say that 
the Constitution is perfect or that these institutions have always played an effective role 
in this young democracy, but it is important to recognize that they do have a distinct 
role in ensuring that the promises of human rights and good governance reach down 
into the daily administration of the country and are not merely the subject of high-
profile legal disputes or of electoral contests held every five years.
 This article will explore the new constitutionally-enshrined institutions that are 
designed to secure greater accountability from those exercising public power. Using 
the example of the Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa’s 1996 post-apartheid 
Constitution, and the institution of the Public Protector in particular, this article 
situates the Public Protector within the broader constitutional and political struggles 
over accountability that have marked the first twenty years of democracy in South 
Africa. In order to explore the role of the Public Protector in particular, Part II of 
this article first surveys the short history of struggles over accountability in the post-
apartheid era as well as the role of the traditional institutions responsible for 
accountability in the democratic constitutional order created by the Constitution. 
Part III of this article examines the origins of the Chapter 9 institutions. Part IV of 
this article explores a seminal case in which the constitutional role of the Public 
Protector is being tested and argues that only an understanding of this institution’s 
structural location within the realm of the separation of powers enables us to 
understand its role as well as secure its potential as an essential part of the system of 
accountability established by the Constitution. Finally, the article concludes that 
given both the Public Protector’s formal constitutional and legal status as well as a 
structural understanding of the constitutional order, it is important to recognize that 
this institution, and the other Chapter 9 institutions, are in effect an additional 
branch of government.
ii.  aCCOUntabiLitY and thE adOptiOn Of indEpEndEnt COnstitUtiOnaL 
institUtiOns
 From early on in the negotiations towards a democratic transition in South Africa, 
the idea of creating an “ombudsman”7 to provide an avenue for public complaints and 
5. The Constitutional Assembly, guided by the Interim Constitution’s Constitutional Principles, was 
responsible for drafting the final Constitution. See generally Cyril Ramaphosa, Negotiating a New 
Nation: Reflections on the Development of South Africa’s Constitution, in The Post-Apartheid 
Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law 71, 80–84 (Penelope Andrews & 
Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001) [hereinafter The Post-Apartheid Constitutions].
6. S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 181–194; see also Karthy Govender, The South African Human Rights 
Commission, in The Post-Apartheid Constitutions, supra note 5, at 571, 572–81, 593.
7. Merriam-Webster defines “ombudsman” as “a person (such as a government official or employee) who 
investigates complaints and tries to deal with problems fairly.” Ombudsman, Merriam-Webster, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ombudsman (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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for the investigation of malfeasance and maladministration in the state and its 
bureaucracy, and even to protect fundamental rights, was shared by the parties.8 The 
scope and nature of such an office, however, remained a matter of debate.9 
Furthermore, the idea of creating independent governance institutions to address the 
high level of distrust between the parties and to enable specific aspects of the 
transition—such as conducting a free and fair election—was also being discussed.10 
The African National Congress (ANC) Legal and Constitutional Committee’s 
working document, “A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa,” published in 1990, 
specifically included the establishment of an independent ombudsman “[w]ith a view 
to ensuring that all functions and duties under the Constitution are carried out in a 
fair way with due respect for the rights and sentiments of those affected.”11 As the 
transition proceeded, however, the ANC also recognized the importance of creating 
transitional mechanisms, independent of F.W. de Klerk’s government,12 as a means of 
ensuring the democratic transition.13 It is out of this legacy that the idea was born to 
incorporate independent institutions for accountability within the post-apartheid 
constitutional order.14
 A. Origins of the Chapter 9 Institutions
 In the post-1990 negotiations, the parties debated both the nature of the electoral 
system as well as how the first democratic elections would be managed. The 
government of the day had traditionally managed the elections, but there was deep 
concern that the legitimacy of the first democratic election would be questioned if it 
were to be managed by the apartheid regime.15 At first, the ANC demanded that an 
interim government be installed, as outlined in the Harare Declaration16 and United 
8. ANC Constitutional Comm., A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa 36–37 (1990) (working document) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa]; see also Press Statement, Dep’t 
of Info. & Publicity, African Nat’l Cong., South African Law Commission’s Report on Group and Human 
Rights (Nov. 15, 1991), http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=8563 (discussing the South African Law 
Commission’s acceptance of the need for establishing an ombudsman).
9. See generally South African Law Commission, Rep. on Constitutional Models (Oct. 1991) (on file with 
author).
10. See Ramaphosa, supra note 5, at 76–78. See generally Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, 
Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction 118–21 (2000).
11. A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa, supra note 8, at 36. See generally Nicholas Haysom, Democracy, 
Constitutionalism and the ANC’s Bill of Rights for a New South Africa, 7 SAJHR 102 (1991).
12. F.W. de Klerk served as the last President of apartheid South Africa from 1989 to 1994. He negotiated the 
political opening that resulted in the adoption of the Interim Constitution. FW de Klerk, FW de Klerk 
Found., http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/aboutus/fw-de-klerk (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
13. See generally Negotiations – A Strategic Perspective, Afr. Nat’l Congress (Nov. 18, 1992), http://www.
anc.org.za/show.php?id=4208.
14. See generally Ramaphosa, supra note 5.
15. See Peter Harris, Birth: The Conspiracy to Stop the ’94 Election 56–57 (2010).
16. Harare Declaration: Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the question of South 
Africa, Afr. Nat’l Congress, § 5(e) (Aug. 21, 1989), http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3856.
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Nations Declaration on Apartheid.17 The regime, however, took the position that 
they would not transfer power before a negotiated solution had been reached. Key to 
the regime’s argument was the claim that there needed to be legal continuity in the 
relationship between the existing legal order and a new democratic order.18 To 
overcome this irreconcilable difference between the parties, the ANC embraced the 
idea of creating independent bodies to manage the transition to democracy, including 
an independent electoral commission to oversee the first democratic election.19 The 
transition to democracy was thus enabled by the establishment of three independent 
institutions: the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media 
Commission, and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.20 This idea of creating 
independent bodies was consistent with the global post-Cold War emphasis on 
democratic constitutionalism,21 and it created the conditions for the adoption of 
“State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy” in the final Constitution. 
This innovation eventually produced six separate constitutional institutions that are 
now often referred to as the Chapter 9 institutions: the Public Protector; the South 
African Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the 
Commission for Gender Equality; the Auditor-General; and the Independent 
Electoral Commission.22
 B. Traditional Forms of Accountability
 In parliamentary systems, as in other constitutional orders, the legislature has 
historically served as both lawgiver and watchdog over the executive branch of 
government. As with other fused systems, in which the separation of powers is not 
enabled by an institutional separation of participants and members of the executive 
are also members of the legislature, the Parliament in South Africa was historically 
never an effective watchdog. Rather, the apartheid Parliament served to rubber-
stamp the ruling party’s decisions, and the system of government served to maintain 
an “entire social edifice . . . structured to enrich a powerful few at the expense of the 
majority.”23
17. G.A. Res. S-16/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-16/1, annex, Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive 
Consequences in Southern Africa (Dec. 14, 1989) (supporting the Harare Declaration).
18. See Heinz Klug, The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual Analysis 13–17 (2010).
19. See Statement of the Nat’l Exec. Comm. on the Occasion of the 81st Anniversary of the ANC, African 
Nat’l Cong. (Jan. 8, 1993), http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=67#sthash.t0N54Ede.dpuf (outlining 
five key steps to be taken, including the creation of an independent electoral commission).
20. See Heinz Klug, Constitution-Making, Democracy and the “Civilizing” of Irreconcilable Conflict: What 
Might We Learn from the South African Miracle?, 25 Wis. Int’l L.J. 269, 277–81 (2007).
21. See Klug, supra note 10, at 23–27.
22. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181.
23. Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National 
Party 1948–1994, at 231 (1996).
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 Instead of a tradition of oversight, the apartheid Parliament was open to the 
influence of:
[M]any pressure groups, such as . . . wine farmers . . . who used their close 
proximity to Parliament to “take people to parties” and provide them with a 
quota of wine annually—this continued in the immediate post-1994 period, 
when [members of Parliament] had access to cost-price wines. . . . These were 
all subtle forms of influence buying that could be compared with contemporary 
private sector-subsidised golf days for politicians and public sector officials.24
 Combining the secrecy of the apartheid regime and its covert operations aimed at 
avoiding international sanctions with a “history of routinised corruption”25 in 
government departments and the bantustan26 administrations, the system produced 
what the Speaker of South Africa’s first democratic Parliament, Frene Ginwala, 
described as “an intrinsically corrupt system of governance . . . [and] a legal framework 
that was based on and facilitated corruption.”27 Explaining the new Parliament’s 
attempts to address this situation, Ginwala said:
It has taken years in Parliament to repeal old laws and introduce even the 
basic legal framework that would enable us to deal with corrupt bureaucrats, 
politicians and police. The private sector also operated in a closed society and 
profited by it. There were partnerships with international criminals, and the 
corruption that was built into the system is very difficult to overcome.28
 In its early years, South Africa’s new Parliament seemed committed to exercising 
its duty to serve as a public watchdog. Despite a lack of resources, parliamentary 
committees often asked probing questions of senior civil servants and even took 
government ministers to task.29 While this early robust exercise of oversight might be 
attributed to the caliber of the membership of the first democratically-elected 
Parliament, which served simultaneously as the national legislature and constitution-
making body, the tendency of members to seek advancement in their political careers, 
24. Hennie van Vuuren, Inst. for Sec. Studies, Apartheid Grand Corruption: Assessing the 
Scale of Crimes of Profit in South Africa from 1976 to 1994, at 25 (2006).
25. Tom Lodge, South African Politics Since 1994, at 60 (1999).
26. The “bantustans” were those areas of South Africa reserved for black occupation, and in which the 
apartheid regime tried to create self-governing territories in an attempt to simulate decolonization while 
continuing to deny the black majority political rights. See Encyclopedia of South Africa 166–68 
(Krista Johnson & Sean Jacobs eds., 2011); Alan Mabin, South African Capital Cities, in Capital Cities 
in Africa: Power and Powerlessness 168, 172–75 (Simon Bekker & Goran Therborn eds., 2012). 
See generally Land Divided, Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st 
Century (Ben Cousins & Cherryl Walker eds., 2015).
27. van Vuuren, supra note 24, at 5 & 97 n.13 (quoting former Speaker of Parliament Frene Ginwala’s 
remarks at the opening session of the Global Forum II of The Hague on May 28, 2001). 
28. Id. at 5–6 & 97 n.13 (quoting former Speaker of Parliament Frene Ginwala’s remarks at the opening 
session of the Global Forum II of The Hague on May 28, 2001).
29. See, e.g., Andrew Feinstein, After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the 
ANC 70–75 (2007).
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as well as the defensiveness of the ruling party, soon led to an increasing passivity.30 
The physical distance between the legislature in Cape Town and the executive and 
administrative departments located more than 1,000 kilometers away in Pretoria 
exacerbated the problem.31 The Parliament’s traditional oversight role was further 
compromised by a scandal over the abuse of benefits enjoyed by its members and its 
handling of the arms deal scandal,32 which has been described as the “poisoned well 
of post-apartheid South African politics.”33
 The new Mandela government’s initial commitment to accountability saw the 
ANC in Parliament giving the Chair of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to an opposition member of Parliament, Gavin Woods 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party.34 However, when SCOPA was presented with the 
Auditor-General’s report indicating that there were problems with the government’s 
procurement of a major arms package for the military and agreed that further 
investigation was necessary, the ANC’s Chief Whip in Parliament, Tony Yengeni, 
argued that a public hearing was not a good idea.35 As tensions developed between 
members of SCOPA, including with the leading ANC member on the Committee, 
the ANC leadership in Parliament moved against the Committee, stacking it with 
loyalists who would be sure to cooperate.36 As Yengeni told a press conference, “there 
was no committee in respect of the ANC which is above party political discipline.”37
 While Yengeni would later be convicted of taking a bribe related to the arms deal,38 
this scandal has now been overshadowed by a new scandal involving the upgrading of 
President Jacob Zuma’s private home in the small rural village of Nkandla.39 Despite 
repeated media exposés of the large amounts of money being spent on the security 
30. See, e.g., Klug, supra note 18, at 176–81.
31. As a result of a compromise between delegates to the all-white National Convention of 1909, the Union 
Constitution of 1910 recognized three formal capitals: Pretoria (administrative), Cape Town (legislative) 
and Bloemfontein (judicial). The 1996 Constitution does not specify a capital, but today the legislature 
(Parliament) remains in Cape Town while the executive is based in Pretoria. The Constitutional Court 
is in Johannesburg while the Supreme Court of Appeal remains in Bloemfontein. See generally Mabin, 
supra note 26.
32. See generally Paul Holden, The Arms Deal In Your Pocket (2008).
33. Mark Gevisser, A Legacy of Liberation: Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African 
Dream 256 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Robert Brand, Committee Chair Faces Tough Test, IOL News (Jan. 23, 2001), http://www.iol.
co.za/news/politics/committee-chair-faces-tough-test-1.58883#.Vj5QVLerSM8 (discussing Woods’s 
appointment to Chairperson of SCOPA and his non-partisan leadership).
35. Feinstein, supra note 29, at 158–62.
36. See id. at 160–62.
37. Klug, supra note 18, at 180 (quoting Tony Yengeni’s remarks at a press conference in 2001 as reported 
by Business Day) (citing Feinstein, supra note 29, at 195 & 274 n.38).
38. See Anne Kriegler, Arms Deal: Seven Facts That Aren’t Going Away, Mail & Guardian (July 30, 2014), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-30-arms-deal-seven-facts-that-arent-going-away.
39. See generally Phillip de Wet, Mail & Guardian, Nkandla: The Great Unravelling (2014) 
(ebook), https://laura-7.atavist.com/mg_nkandla-the-great-unravelling.
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upgrade at Nkandla, Parliament seemed determined to ignore the concerns of those 
who questioned the amount of state resources being spent.40 It was only after opposition 
parties complained to the Public Protector that the issue of Nkandla began to receive 
serious government attention through the appointment of various executive branch-
controlled investigations.41 At the same time, there was a concerted effort to suggest 
that these alternative investigations meant that the Public Protector should not take up 
the case.42 When the Office of the Public Protector issued its report, Secure in Comfort, 
indicating that the President and his family had “unduly benefited” from the upgrade,43 
the response was to question the Public Protector’s suggested remedy: that the President 
pay back some of the money expended.44
iii. thE ChaptEr 9 institUtiOns
 Just as the Constitution holds a twin promise, on the one hand empowering 
government and protecting existing rights, while on the other hand providing a vision of 
a nonracial, nonsexist future in which all communities and members of South African 
society may flourish, Chapter 9 establishes institutions that are designed to both secure 
existing rights and democratic achievements and provide an institutional mechanism for 
establishing the norms and capacities for moving towards the vision of a brighter future. 
At one end of the institutional spectrum, the Independent Electoral Commission, the 
Auditor-General, and the Public Protector are institutions that are primarily designed 
to ensure good governance today. On the other end, the South African Human Rights 
Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, and the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities not only look to the present but are also designed to advance and extend 
these interests towards the achievement of the vision of a more equitable and sustainable 
society. In order to achieve these goals, the Constitution establishes all these institutions 
as “independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law,” requiring them to be 
“impartial” and to “exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice.”45 The translation of this promise into the reality of functioning 
institutions has, however, not been without difficulty.
40. See id. § 4.
41. See id. 
42. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Secure in Comfort: Report on an Investigation into Allegations 
of Impropriety and Unethical Conduct Relating to the Installation and Implementation 
of Security Measures by the Department of Public Works at and in Respect of the Private 
Residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal Province: Report 
No. 25 of 2013/14, at 96–103 (2014) [hereinafter Secure in Comfort].
43. Id. at 63.
44. See Justice Minister Criticises Public Protector, Polity (July 15, 2014), http://www.polity.org.za/article/
justice-minister-criticises-public-protector-2014-07-15; Nkandla: Thuli Madonsela’s Tough Letter to Jacob 
Zuma, News24: City Press (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Nkandla-
Thuli-Madonselas-tough-letter-to-Jacob-Zuma-20150429.
45. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(2).
162
AccountAbility And the Role of independent constitutionAl institutions NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
 These new institutions have not avoided controversy. As they have progressed, 
from their initial creation or redirection, they have experienced internal personnel 
conflicts and debates over their goals and missions as well as external challenges to 
their legitimacy and financial independence.46 While the Independent Electoral 
Commission has successfully managed four electoral cycles in addition to local 
government elections and the long established Auditor-General had a pre-existing 
institutional culture and staff, the remaining Chapter 9 institutions have had a struggle 
defining and establishing their respective institutional capacities and constitutional 
roles. At the same time, there have been increasing questions about their degrees of 
independence. With debates over adequate financing and accountability, as well as the 
resulting caution of some of these institutions, there have been increasing concerns over 
the political careerism of their office-holders and questions about their willingness to 
exercise the formal independence they enjoy.47 In response to these concerns, the 
government decided to initiate a review of these institutions.48
 The decision to review the Chapter 9 institutions immediately ran into a 
separation of powers problem. How appropriate would it be for the executive, the 
main institution to be held accountable by the Chapter 9 bodies, to conduct the 
review?49 Realizing that this would be a problem, the executive called upon the 
National Assembly, to which the Constitution makes these institutions formally 
accountable, to do a review.50 As a result, the National Assembly adopted a resolution 
in September 2006 appointing an ad hoc multi-party committee to review the 
Chapter 9 institutions (the “Committee”).51 The Committee was asked “to assess in 
broad terms whether the current and intended legal mandates of the institutions are 
suitable for the South African environment, whether their consumption of resources 
is justified in relation to their outputs and contribution to democracy,” and most 
significantly, “whether a rationalisation of function, role or organization is desirable 
or will diminish the focus on important areas.”52
46. See, e.g., Parliament of the Republic of S. Afr., Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review 
of Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions (2007) [hereinafter ad hoc Committee Report].
47. See Pierre de Vos, Balancing Independence and Accountability: The Role of Chapter 9 Institutions in South 
Africa’s Constitutional Democracy, in Accountable Government in Africa: Perspectives from 
Public Law and Political Studies 160 (Danwood M. Chirwa & Lia Nijzink eds., 2012); see also ad 
hoc Committee Report, supra note 46, at ix–x.
48. Press Statement, Parliament of the Republic of S. Afr., The Ad Hoc Committee on Review of State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/
contentpopup.php?Item_ID=419&Category_ID=; see also ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 46, 
at ix–x.
49. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 46, at ix.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at xi.
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 The Report of the Committee, chaired by Kader Asmal and issued in mid-2007, 
called for significant reforms to some of these institutions.53 Identifying an apparent 
“lack of consistency and coherence in approach” which the Committee argued is 
“ultimately undermining . . . [these institutions’] individual, and even common, 
efforts,” the Committee called on Parliament to conduct an “urgent review for the 
purposes of identifying a more systematic approach, particularly [for] funding and 
budgets, the appointment of commissioners, collaboration between the institutions, 
internal governance arrangements and the relationship of the institutions with 
Parliament.”54 One recommendation of the Committee was that a number of the 
Chapter 9 and related institutions, such as the Pan South African Language Board 
and the National Youth Commission, be consolidated into an “umbrella human 
rights body called the South African Commission on Human Rights and Equality.”55 
The Committee recognized that the number of human rights institutions created by 
Chapter 9 was the product of the particular history of South Africa’s democratic 
transition and argued “the present institutional framework has created fragmentation, 
confounding the intention that these institutions would support the seamless 
application of the Bill of Rights.”56
 However, the Committee also noted that despite internal challenges, the South 
African Human Rights Commission57 had continued to expand and develop its 
activities.58 This was reflected in the number of complaints received, which increased 
from 5,763 in 1999–2000 to 11,710 in 2005–2006.59 The Committee further 
recognized the progressive improvement in the six Socio-Economic Rights Reports 
issued by the South African Human Rights Commission, which showed a “vast 
improvement in the manner in which information is solicited from government 
53. See id. at ix–xiv. 
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id. at xii.
56. Id. at 37.
57. The South African Human Rights Commission, a Chapter 9 institution, is charged with the duty to 
promote, protect, and monitor the achievement of human rights in South Africa. For this purpose, the 
Commission is required to “develop and conduct information programmes,” Human Rights Commission 
Act 54 of 1994 § 7(1)(a), and is given broad investigative powers to determine if there are violations or 
threats to fundamental rights. In addition, the statute empowers the Commission to resolve violations of 
any fundamental human right through mediation, conciliation, and negotiation. In practice, the 
Commission has been most active in promoting human rights through education, intervening as an amicus 
in court cases, and on occasion establishing high-profile investigations into particular areas of human 
rights concern. In addition to these activities, the Commission has issued regular reports on the status and 
implementation of human rights in South Africa, including socioeconomic rights. See ad hoc Committee 
Report, supra note 46, at 167–86 (outlining the Commission’s mandates, duties, achievements, and 
challenges, and providing recommendations); see also S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 184; Human Rights 
Commission Act 54 of 1994 §§ 7–9.
58. See ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 46, at 179, 182.
59. Id. at 179.
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departments and the accuracy with which that information is reported.”60 Having 
received the Committee’s Report, Parliament made no effort to take up the challenge 
of the internal tensions and overlapping mandates identified by the Committee. Two 
years later, Kader Asmal, deeply distressed by the failure of the government, and the 
National Assembly in particular, to take up the Committee’s Report in a timely 
fashion, publicly “accused Parliament of having no interest in his review of Chapter 9 
institutions . . . saying that the failure to debate the review was ‘an appalling scandal.’”61 
Despite Asmal’s disappointment, now, nearly a decade later, the Chapter 9 institutions 
have become an unquestioned part of the institutional landscape, and despite the 
unique constitutional character of this “fourth branch” of government, it has proven 
to be a valuable addition in what has become, from a global perspective, a vibrant and 
contentious young democracy.
 A.  The Limits of Good Governance: Legal Technologies, Sophisticated Systems, and 
the Capacity to Govern
 South Africa’s first democratic government came into being at a moment when the 
technologies of governance and expectations about how government may more readily 
reflect the imagined efficiency of the market became dominant themes around the 
globe. Responding to the collapse of state socialism and the emergence of the United 
States as the sole superpower, the new South African government embraced the latest 
technologies of governance, from the Internet to negotiated rulemaking, recognizing 
as well an extensive range of procedural obligations and rights in the administrative 
and procurement processes of the state.62 As a result, the South African legal framework 
establishing the rules and processes of good governance is among the most sophisticated 
in the world, from the unique structure of the Constitution to the adoption of a 
plethora of new statutes such as the Public Finance Management Act;63 the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act;64 the Promotion of Access to Information Act;65 the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act;66 and at the local level, the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act.67 The difficulty, however, is to ensure that this 
elaborate legal framework functions.
60. Id. at 179–80. 
61. Mmanaledi Mataboge, Asmal Takes on Parliament, Mail & Guardian (July 20, 2009) (quoting Kader 
Asmal), http://mg.co.za/article/2009-07-20-asmal-takes-on-parliament.
62. See Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, Towards a Ten Year Review: Synthesis 
Report on Implementation of Government Programmes 10–16 (2003). See generally Governance 
in the New South Africa: The Challenges of Globalisation (Guy Mhone & Omano Edigheji 
eds., 2003); Protecting the Inheritance: Governance and Public Accountability in 
Democratic South Africa (Daniel Plaatjies ed., 2013).
63. Act 1 of 1999.
64. Act 3 of 2000.
65. Act 2 of 2000.
66. Act 5 of 2000.
67. Act 32 of 2000.
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 While the Constitution may attempt to distribute executive authority among a 
variety of institutions so as to mediate the effects of concentrated power, particularly 
within a polity in which the dominance of a single political party seems relatively 
secure for the foreseeable future, the emergence of a unipolar democracy has placed 
limits on the relative independence of these institutions.68 Furthermore, the 
sophistication of these systems of governance requires a high degree of legal capacity, 
yet the legal field in South Africa, from the profession to academia, has also been 
faced with the necessity and obvious strains of transformation. Given recent history, 
in which administrative law was creatively used to oppose the arbitrary use of power 
by the old regime,69 and the common law lawyer’s pride in the sources of administrative 
law principles, it is not a surprise that many continue to see these principles as in 
some way underlying or informing the new constitutional and statutory framework.70 
Thus, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court has clearly indicated that the 
practice of governance is based solely on the new framework,71 the understanding of 
the new framework remains deeply influenced by both common law conceptions of 
administrative law as well as a conception of the separation of powers that is at odds 
with the more f luid distribution of power that characterizes the structure and 
institutional provisions of the Constitution.
 These impediments and limitations on the transformation of law do not, however, 
fully explain the tensions within the government, which has come under increasing 
stress since the latter years of President Thabo Mbeki’s term in office. Issues of 
governance in this context became embroiled in the political struggles being waged 
between different political factions within the ANC at all levels of government. Most 
significant was the accusation of corruption that led to the dismissal of then-Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma72 and the subsequent claim that President Mbeki improperly 
68. C. Murray, The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the Role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?, 9 
Potchefstroom Electronic L.J., 2006, at 122, 124, http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/
html/fakulteite/regte/per/issuepages/2006Volume9no2/2006x2x_Murray_art.pdf.
69. See Arthur Chaskalson, Legal Control of the Administrative Process, 102 SALJ 419 (1985) (reviewing 
judicial control and review of administrative law during apartheid). For further detailed accounts on the 
use of administrative law to oppose apartheid’s arbitrary use of power, see generally Richard L. Abel, 
Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980–1994, at 23–65 
(1995) and Stephen Ellmann, In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa’s State 
of Emergency (1992).
70. See Hugh Corder, Administrative Justice, in Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South 
African Legal Order 387, 390 (Dawid van Wyk et al. eds., 1994) (acknowledging that every 
participant in the constitutional debate “accepts without question that administrative justice is a goal 
worth constitutionalizing, both in the form of a right to some degree of judicial review, as well as in 
providing for freedom of information and the office of [the] ombudsman”). For a thorough account of 
the relationships between administrative law and the f inal Constitution, see Yvonne Burns, 
Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (rev. reprt. 1999).
71. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para. 44 (“There is only one system of law. It is 
shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.”).
72. South African Leader Sacks Deputy, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4092064.stm (last 
updated June 14, 2005). 
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inf luenced the National Prosecuting Authority in his conflict with Zuma.73 This 
latter accusation ultimately led to Mbeki’s resignation as President after a High Court 
judge endorsed the claims of political interference.74 While the High Court’s decision 
was severely criticized and overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeal,75 this did not 
change the political outcome.76
 Apart from this case, in which law and legal process was used to wage and resolve 
political struggles for power within the ruling party, there are also countless examples 
of cases in which government officials, high and low, are accused of corruption or 
other wrongdoing.77 In response to these accusations, the use of legal and administrative 
process allows different factions to gain access to positions of power and authority 
while those accused are “suspended” with full pay from their government positions. 
Among the most notorious cases over the last twenty years were the suspension78 and 
later trial for rape of then-Deputy President Zuma;79 the corruption trial of former-
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service Jackie Selebi;80 the 
accusations of fraud and the withholding of information levelled against the former-
Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency, Billy Masetlha;81 the official 
commissions of enquiry into accusations that Bulelani Ngcuka, former head of the 
73. NPA: Mbeki Not Behind Zuma Charges, Mail & Guardian (Dec. 30, 2007), http://mg.co.za/article/2007-
12-30-npa-mbeki-not-behind-zuma-charges. While Mbeki and Zuma worked closely together in exile, 
accusations that Zuma was implicated in the arms deal corruption, and the political conflict over Mbeki’s 
HIV/AIDS denialism and economic policies, led to increasing tensions between the two. See William 
Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC 310–12 (Marléne 
Burger ed., 2005). After Mbeki dismissed Zuma as Deputy President, the tension between them broke 
into direct conflict as Zuma challenged Mbeki for leadership of the ANC. Id.
74. See Jonathan Klaaren & Theunis Roux, The Nicholson Judgment: An Exercise in Law and Politics, 54 J. 
Afr. L. 143 (2010) (discussing Judge Nicholson’s ruling in Zuma v. Nat’ l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2009 
(1) BCLR 62 (N)).
75. Nat’ l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA).
76. In any event, by the time of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision overturning Nicholson’s decision, 
Mbeki had already resigned. See generally Megan Lindow, Why South Africa’s Mbeki Resigned, Time 
(Sept. 20, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1843112,00.html.
77. For a history of political corruption in South Africa, see Tom Lodge, Political Corruption in South Africa, 
97 Afr. Aff. 157 (1998).
78. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
79. Michael Wines, A Highly Charged Rape Trial Tests South Africa’s Ideals, N.Y. Times (Apr. 10, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/africa/10africa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Michael 
Wines, South Africa Acquits Zuma in Rape Trial, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2006), http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/05/08/world/africa/08cnd-africa.html.
80. Barry Bearak, South African Ex-Official Guilty of Graft, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2010, at A7; see also Paulus 
Zulu, A Nation in Crisis: An Appeal for Morality 187–91 (2013) (reviewing the events and 
allegations leading up to Selebi’s corruption trial).
81. See Martin Plaut & Paul Holden, Who Rules South Africa?: Pulling the Strings in the 
Battle for Power 135–38 (2012) (recounting the hoax email saga involving Masetlha).
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National Prosecuting Authority, had been an apartheid spy;82 and the finding by the 
Ginwala Commission of Enquiry that despite then-President Mbeki’s suspending of 
Vusumzi “Vusi” Pikoli, who succeeded Ngcuka as head of the National Prosecuting 
Authority, Pikoli was fit to hold office.83 The result is that although some officials are 
suspended, they continue to receive their government salaries and benefits while they 
contest the claims against them.84 Furthermore, the fact that government feels legally 
obliged to cover legal costs for those accused of wrongdoing in their official capacities 
fuels a continuing process of political struggle through law within the executive 
branches of the post-apartheid state.85
 These conflicts play out within a formal legal framework that is clear on paper 
yet ambiguously suspended between legal duties and ethical standards. Although the 
President is duty-bound to “uphold, defend and respect” the Constitution86 and 
members of Cabinet are also formally responsible “collectively and individually to 
Parliament,”87 the task of achieving accountability of the executive remains daunting. 
Apart from these constitutional imperatives, Cabinet members are also bound by a 
code of ethics (the “Ethics Code”) published in 200088 pursuant to section 2 of the 
Executive Members’ Ethics Act.89 The Constitution and the Ethics Code dictate 
that Cabinet members must refrain from undertaking other paid work, using their 
positions to enrich themselves or others, acting in ways that are inconsistent with 
their office, or involving themselves in situations which might give rise to conflicts 
of interest between their official responsibilities and private interests.90 The Ethics 
Code also requires Cabinet members to “declare any personal or private financial or 
business interest” they might have in matters that are before the executive body,91 and 
in the case of a conflict of interest, to either withdraw from the decisionmaking 
82. See Andrew Meldrum, Apartheid Spy Clears Prosecutor, The Guardian (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/22/southafrica.andrewmeldrum.
83. Vusi Pikoli & Mandy Wiener, My Second Initiation: The Memoir of Vusi Pikoli 290, 303–04 
(2013).
84. See, e.g., Letter from then-President Thabo Mbeki to Advocate Vusi Pikoli, in Pikoli & Wiener, supra 
note 83, at 272–73 (informing Pikoli of his suspension as National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
of his continued receipt of full government benefits during his suspension).
85. See, e.g., Karl Gernetzky, SABC ‘Footing Motsoeneng’s Legal Bills’, Bus. Day (Sept. 21, 2015), http://
www.bdlive.co.za/national/media/2015/09/21/sabc-footing-motsoenengs-legal-bills.
86. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 83(b).
87. Id. § 92(2).
88. Executive Ethics Code, GN 41 of GG 21399 (20 July 2000) [hereinafter Executive Ethics Code].
89. Act 82 of 1998 § 2.
90. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 96(2); see also Executive Ethics Code, supra note 88, § 2.3(c)–(f).
91. Executive Ethics Code, supra note 88, § 3.1.
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process or ask the relevant Premier or President for permission to participate.92 There 
is also a duty to report these interests to the Secretary of the Cabinet.93
 In 2006, however, when the Public Protector investigated accusations over 
violations of the Ethics Code, including failures to report financial interests, the 
Public Protector concluded that there had been no violation of the Code because the 
databases relied upon by the Auditor-General were not always up to date and that 
there was a “misunderstanding in regard to the interests that Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers are obliged to disclose.”94 Even though the country can boast about having 
a sophisticated constitutional and legislative framework to ensure executive 
accountability, the enforcement of these provisions remains at issue and has led to 
repeated efforts to address corruption, including the creation of a new anti-corruption 
Cabinet team in 2009.95 Appointing Thulisile “Thuli” Madonsela as South Africa’s 
Public Protector that same year, President Jacob Zuma stated that “[s]he will need to 
ensure that this office continues to be accessible to ordinary citizens and undertakes 
its work without fear or favour.”96
 B. The Institution of the Public Protector
 In contrast to this idealistic legal and constitutional framework, it is clear that 
the work of ensuring accountability is much more complicated. In practice, then, the 
repeated framing of the law as a neutral arbiter of power must be understood in the 
context of the politics and institutions that are established and serve to bring life to 
the law. In order to understand the place of specific institutions in this process, we 
must recognize that institutions do not exist because they are named in the 
Constitution but rather that institutions have histories, processes, and individual 
participants that together shape their capacity to fulfill the roles assigned to them. If 
we take the Public Protector as a key example of one of the constitutional institutions 
for protecting democracy and achieving good governance, we will be able to reflect 
on the process of establishing the necessary institutional capacity as well as the 
resources, time, and leadership that is necessary to achieve the goal of accountability.
 While the Public Protector was first established by the Interim Constitution in 
199497 and brought into existence through legislation via the Public Protector Act 
92. Id. § 3.2–3.3.
93. Id. § 5.
94. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Report on an Investigation in Connection with Compliance by 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers with the Provisions of the Executive Ethics Code 
Relating to the Disclosure of Financial Interests: Report No. 2 of 2006, at 4 (2006).
95. See, e.g., New Anti-Corruption Team Established, Mail & Guardian (Nov. 19, 2009), http://mg.co.za/
article/2009-11-19-new-anticorruption-team-established.
96. Meet the New Public Protector, IOL News (Oct. 18, 2009) (quoting President Jacob Zuma), http://beta.
iol.co.za/news/politics/meet-the-new-public-protector-461858.
97. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 110(1).
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that same year,98 the institution was given increased status by its inclusion as one of 
the independent Chapter 9 institutions that marked one of the unique features of the 
final Constitution. Once provided for by statute, it fell to the first Public Protector, 
Advocate99 Selby Baqwa, to begin the task of setting up the institution at its inception 
in 1995.100 By 1999, there were only two regional offices, one in the North West 
province and one in the Eastern Cape.101 Only in 2001 were additional offices added 
in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape.102 Two additional 
provincial offices, in the Northern Cape and Free State, were added in 2002,103 while 
the Limpopo and Gauteng offices were only established in 2003104 and 2004,105 
respectively. While it took nearly ten years to create this institutional infrastructure, 
today the Public Protector has regional offices in all nine provinces as well as a 
national office in Pretoria.106 Additionally, there are twenty walk-in offices around 
the country as well as a toll-free line and other mechanisms aimed at making the 
institution accessible to the public.107
98. Act 23 of 1994 § 1A(1).
99. The term “Advocate” refers to the professional status of the individual—that they are an advocate in the 
split bar structure of the South African legal profession. The statuses of advocates and attorneys in 
South Africa are similar to those of barristers and solicitors in the United Kingdom. For more on the 
status of legal practitioners in South Africa, see generally François du Bois, Introduction: History, System 
and Sources, in Introduction to the Law of South Africa 1, 32–35 (C.G. van der Merwe et al. 
eds., 2004).
100. See David McQuoid-Mason, The Role of Human Rights Institutions in South Africa, in Human Rights 
Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences Throughout the World 16, 16 
(Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000); see also Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 § 3 (laying out the procedures 
for establishing staffing and remuneration levels within the Office of the Public Protector).
101. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 1999, at 45 (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pub. 
Protector Annual Report 1999]. The Public Protector Annual Reports are based on a fiscal year 
that runs between April 1 of one year until March 31 of the following year.
102. Id.
103. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2003/2004, at 16–17 (2004) [hereinafter Pub. Protector 
Annual Report 2003/2004].
104. The Limpopo office started operating in 2002 but only officially launched in April 2003. Id. at 19.
105. Media Release, Pub. Protector S. Afr., Pub. Protector: Provincial Office in Gauteng (Nov. 22, 2004), 
http://www.publicprotector.org/media_gallery/2004/22112004.asp.
106. For information on the location of the Public Protector’s provincial and regional offices, see Contact the 
Offices of the Public Protector, Pub. Protector S. Afr., http://www.pprotect.org/contact_us/provincial_
regional_offices.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). For information on their national office, see National 
Office, Pub. Protector, http://www.pprotect.org/contact_us/national_office.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016).
107. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Public Protector Vision 2020 and Strategic Plan: 2011–2014, at 8 
(2011) [hereinafter Pub. Protector Strategic Plan 2011–2014].
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Figure 1: Expenditures [in millions of Rand]108
 This process of institution building is also reflected in the budget, which grew 
steadily over its first decade, with expenditures increasing from approximately 
ZAR15.4 million in 1999109 to just over ZAR99 million in 2009.110 As the Public 
Protector’s office has become institutionalized, its budget and workload have continued 
to expand. In the last five years, expenditures have doubled to just under ZAR200 
million in 2013–2014111 and the staff has grown from an initial ninety-one members 
at its founding in 1999112 to 314 in 2013–2014.113 In addition to investigating and 
resolving complaints, the staff is actively involved in public “outreach, education and 
communication activities, including clinics and information sessions,” in an effort “to 
108. The graphs presented in this article are based upon the research and information contained within the 
Public Protector’s Annual Reports for the years covering 1999–2014. Beginning with the Public 
Protector Annual Report of 2003–2004, these reports are available on the Public Protector’s web site. 
See Annual Reports, Pub. Protector S. Afr., http://www.publicprotector.org/library/annual_report/
annual_report.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). Annual Reports published between 1999 and 2002 are on 
file with the author.
109. Pub. Protector Annual Report 1999, supra note 101, at 45. ZAR refers to Rand, South Africa’s 
currency.
110. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2009/2010, at 98 (2010) [hereinafter Pub. Protector 
Annual Report 2009/2010]. These figures are based on the expenditures which ref lect the increase in 
the budget but are a more accurate measure of actual growth.
111. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2013/2014, at 14 (2014) [hereinafter Pub. Protector 
Annual Report 2013/2014].
112. Pub. Protector Annual Report 1999, supra note 101, at 44–45.
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bring [the Public Protector’s] services closer to communities.”114 Most of the complaints 
received by the Public Protector “involve service and conduct failure, including abuse 
of resources,” and the institution sees one of its key challenges as “positioning the 
office as a buffer between the state and ordinary people as opposed to an agency that 
primarily deals with high profile cases as often [focused on] by the media.”115
Figure 2: Staff116
 Another way of viewing this developing institution is to consider its role through 
the number of cases that it has taken up and resolved since its creation. If we take the 
decade from 1999 until 2009, we can see a pattern in which complaints rose from 
9,085 in 1999117 to a high of 22,350 in 2004–2005118 before falling to 16,136 in 
2009 –2010.119 The steady increase in cases until 2005 probably reflects the growing 
infrastructure and capacity of the Public Protector as it opened offices around the 
country. By contrast, the reason for the decline in cases between 2005 and 2009 is less 
obvious, although it might ref lect the negative media attention that then-Public 
Protector Lawrence Mushwana received and the perception that while the resolution 
114. Pub. Protector Strategic Plan 2011–2014, supra note 107, at 8.
115. Id. at 9.
116. See supra note 108.
117. Pub. Protector Annual Report 1999, supra note 101, at 14 (referring to “[n]ew cases received”).
118. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2004/2005, at 20 (2005) [hereinafter Pub. Protector 
Annual Report 2004/2005].
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of cases rose dramatically after his appointment in 2002, the Public Protector’s office 
was not pursuing its mandate effectively.120 The throughput of cases of course 
increased in relation to the increase in complaints, but there was a dramatic increase 
in resolutions in 2002–2003 to 21,705.121 The pace of resolution did, however, settle 
into a fairly stable range from 15,946 in 2003–2004122 to 14,738 in 2009–2010.123 At 
the same time, the jurisdiction of the Public Protector has continued to grow as 
additional legislation enacted by Parliament has granted it expanded authority to 
address issues of corruption and maladministration, consistent with the Public 
Protector’s constitutional mandate.124
Figure 3: Number of Cases125
120. Advocate Lawrence Mushwana served as Public Protector from 2002 to 2009. He regularly came under 
severe criticism during his tenure, including from the leader of the political opposition, Helen Zille. See, 
e.g., Michael Hamlyn, Zille Accuses Public Protector of Abuse of Office, Mail & Guardian (Feb. 22, 
2008), http://mg.co.za/article/2008-02-22-zille-accuses-public-protector-of-abuse-office.
121. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2002/2003, at 14 (2003).
122. Pub. Protector Annual Report 2003/2004, supra note 103, at 10.
123. Pub. Protector Annual Report 2009/2010, supra note 110, at 11.
124. See National Energy Regulator Act 40 of 2004; Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 
of 2004; Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999; National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; Housing 
Consumers Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998; Lotteries Act 57 of 1997; Special Investigating Units 
and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996; National Archives and Records Service of South Africa Act 43 of 
1996; Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
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 President Zuma’s 2009 appointment of Advocate Thuli Madonsela, a well-
respected human rights advocate, led to hope that the Office of the Public Protector 
“might yet fulfil the constitutional role it was envisioned to play.”126 Indeed, during 
the first six years of her seven-year term, Public Protector Madonsela has dramatically 
increased the capacity and profile of the institution. During this period, the Public 
Protector adopted a number of strategies to both strengthen the institution and 
ensure a more effective response to growing public concerns over maladministration 
and corruption. Among a range of new initiatives, the Public Protector has sought to 
increase the capacity of staff through training (often through partnerships and links 
to ombudsman institutions around the globe)127 as well as through the reorganization 
of the office to improve the institution’s functioning.128
 One of the first innovations introduced was the creation of an Early Resolution 
Unit designed to employ the tools of alternative dispute resolution—conciliation, 
mediation, and negotiation—to resolve complaints of “state maladministration and 
other forms of improper conduct.”129 At the same time, investigations were separated 
into three categories: National Investigations, Provincial Investigations, and Special 
Investigations.130 In addition, the Public Protector faced an ever-expanding mandate 
as Parliament passed additional legislation aimed at addressing the growing problem 
of corruption, including: the earlier-mentioned Executive Members’ Ethics Act,131 the 
Protected Disclosures Act,132 the Promotion of Access to Information Act,133 and the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.134 In addition to these mandates, 
the Public Protector has also initiated her own investigations based on newspaper 
reports or concerns about systematic failures in specific government departments.135
 The success of the institution in this period is ref lected most simply in the 
growing demand for its services. While the media and political process are most 
closely focused on the high-profile special investigations being conducted by the 
Public Protector, it is the dramatic growth in everyday complaints—from 16,136 in 
126. Klug, supra note 18, at 216; see also Chris Bathembu, Zuma Appoints New Public Protector, SouthAfrica.
Info (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/pubprotector-190909.htm#.
Vj0WFrerSM9.
127. See Public Protector Investigators Sharpen Their Teeth, S. Afr. Gov’t News Agency (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/public-protector-investigators-sharpen-their-teeth.
128. See Pub. Protector Strategic Plan 2011–2014, supra note 107.
129. Pub. Protector Annual Report 2009/2010, supra note 110, at 40.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Act 82 of 1998.
132. Act 26 of 2000.
133. Act 2 of 2000.
134. Act 12 of 2004.
135. See generally Investigation Reports, Pub. Protector S. Afr., http://www.pprotect.org/library/
investigation_report/investigation_report.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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2009–2010,136 to handling nearly 40,000 in 2014–2015137—that demonstrates the 
impact of this institution. One explanation for this explosive growth may be that in 
a political process based on proportional representation among political parties, 
members of the public feel that they do not have an elected representative to whom 
they can turn and that the political parties have been unable to provide this level of 
assistance to members of the public who feel mistreated by the bureaucracy or other 
official actors. Another possible explanation is that the high-profile cases against 
senior politicians and officials, including the Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service,138 Cabinet members,139 and even the President,140 have produced a 
level of media and public exposure that has given the public confidence in this 
institution. As expressed in the Public Protector’s 2011–2014 Strategic Plan, there is 
a “value of having this office as a buffer between citizens and government [in] that 
[it] seeks to strengthen constitutional democracy by promptly and impartially 
redressing administrative wrongs of the state.”141
 From the perspective of the Public Protector, the main focus of the office, as 
evident in the institution’s publications and annual reports to Parliament, is on 
serving the public by “bring[ing] much-needed relief to the ‘Gogo Dlaminis’142 
wronged by the state.”143 While this self-image of helping resolve the bureaucratic 
frustrations experienced by the prototype figure of “Grandmother Dlamini” may in 
fact represent the vast bulk of service delivery, social grant, and pension complaints 
resolved by the Public Protector around the country, it is the Public Protector’s direct 
engagement through self-initiated investigations that may have the broadest impact, 
especially in the context of increasingly violent service delivery protests.144 Speaking 
after initiating an investigation into conditions in Braamfischerville, Soweto, Public 
Protector Madonsela thanked the local community leadership for “embracing the 
[C]onstitution and working within its mechanisms to hold government accountable 
136. Pub. Protector Annual Report 2009/2010, supra note 110, at 11.
137. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2014/2015 (2015) (on file with author).
138. See Sarah Evans, Police Commissioner Rejects SAIRR Report on SAPS Criminality, Mail & Guardian 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-28-police-commissioner-rejects-sairr-report-on-saps-
as-malicious.
139. See Zuma’s Cabinet: Cronyism Over Good Governance, Says DA, Mail & Guardian (May 26, 2014), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-26-zuma-cares-about-cronyism-instead-of-good-governance-says-da.
140. See Philip de Wet, Jacob Zuma’s R11-Million Problem, Mail & Guardian (July 31, 2015), http://mg.co.
za/article/2015-07-30-jacob-zumas-r11-million-problem.
141. Pub. Protector Strategic Plan 2011–2014, supra note 107, at 11.
142. “Gogo” is the isiZulu word for grandmother and “Dlamini” is a very common Nguni surname. As used 
by the Public Protector, this is a reference to the regular folk who are frustrated by bureaucratic 
maladministration and who turn to the Public Protector for assistance.
143. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2012/2013, at 4 (2013).
144. See, e.g., Laura Grant, Research Shows Sharp Increase in Service Delivery Protests, Mail & Guardian 
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-
protests. 
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for service delivery, instead of rioting.”145 Urging other communities to follow this 
example, the Public Protector added further that “in giving the people a voice and 
serving as the conscience of the state, her office would seek answers from the City, 
with a view to holding those responsible for the situation to account.”146 The response 
to the institution’s new proactive stance was a surge in public confidence matched by 
increasing criticism by the legislature and a reluctance to meet the institution’s budget 
and staffing demands.147
 While the Public Protector may see its role as impartial, the political parties, and 
particularly the governing party and its senior officials, often express concern that 
other parties and interests use the institution as part of continuing inter-party 
political conflict.148 While it is hardly a surprise that opposing parties would attempt 
to discredit their political opponents by pointing out their failures or initiating 
investigations, the Public Protector has sought to retain a balance between high-
profile, media-driven cases and the daily work of the institution.149 Despite these 
efforts, there has been increasing tension with the ruling party and government 
officials, leading the Public Protector to acknowledge that “[u]nfortunately, a number 
of organs of state are increasingly becoming adversarial in their dealings with the 
Public Protector.”150 Responding to this problem, the Public Protector has attempted 
to increase communication “with the government, highlighting the role of the Public 
Protector in reconciling the state and its people by giving . . . the state a conscience.”151 
Despite these efforts, tensions reached a climax in 2014 as the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation into allegations that excessive state resources had been 
used in an upgrade of President Zuma’s private Nkandla home.152
 C. Constitutional Mandates and the Separation of Powers 
 The institutional consequences of this unavoidable tension between the Public 
Protector and the government officials the institution investigates have been 
145. Media Release, Pub. Protector S. Afr., Public Protector Inspects Sewerage-f looded Braamfischerville 
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.publicprotector.org/media_gallery/2012/27032012.asp.
146. Id. 
147. See Thabo Mokone, Madonsela: No Funds, No Public Protector, Times Live (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.
timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/10/23/madonsela-no-funds-no-public-protector.
148. See, e.g., Emsie Ferreira, Another Nkandla Deadlock Looms, IOL News (July 30, 2015), http://beta.iol.
co.za/news/politics/another-nkandla-deadlock-looms-1893229.
149. See generally Alexis Okeowo, Can Thulisile Madonsela Save South Africa From Itself?, N.Y. Times Mag. 
(June 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/magazine/can-thulisile-madonsela-save-south-
africa-from-itself.html?_r=0.
150. Pub. Protector Strategic Plan 2011–2014, supra note 107, at 10.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Matuma Letsoalo, Thuli Madonsela Snubbed by ANC Brass, Mail & Guardian (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-03-13-thuli-madonsela-snubbed-by-anc-brass. See generally Secure 
in Comfort, supra note 42, at 14–17 (revealing issues faced by the Public Protector in pursuing the 
investigation).
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threefold. First, it has brought increased media and even international attention to 
the high-profile work of the Public Protector.153 Second, it has led to increased 
hostility from the ruling party, particularly from elements that refuse to accept 
criticism of President Zuma.154 Finally, it has led to an increasingly heated debate 
over the formal authority of the Public Protector, particularly in relation to the 
institution’s constitutional mandate to provide a remedy.155 It is this last issue that 
goes to the heart of the constitutional authority of the Public Protector as one of the 
institutions created to promote constitutional democracy. 
 As far as some in the ruling party are concerned, the Public Protector is 
responsible to Parliament, which they feel has the right to question the institution’s 
activities and decide whether the Public Protector’s decisions need to be 
implemented.156 In support of their claim, they may point to section 181(5) of the 
Constitution, which states that the Public Protector, along with the other Chapter 9 
institutions, is “accountable to the National Assembly.”157 In contrast to this broad 
claim of parliamentary authority, the Public Protector has often pointed out158 that 
section 182(1) empowers the institution to investigate, report, and “take appropriate 
remedial action.”159 The Public Protector has also pointed to section 181(2) of the 
Constitution,160 which states that the Chapter 9 institutions are “independent, and 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must 
exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.”161 
It is the confluence of these mandates and tensions over high-profile cases, such as 
the security upgrades to President Zuma’s home at Nkandla, that have brought the 
problem of the separation of powers to the fore.
153. Public Protector Thuli Madonsela has received a number of national and international awards and was 
named in Time magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential people in the world in 2014. See Madonsela 
Listed Among Time’s 100 Most Influential People, Mail & Guardian (Apr. 24, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-04-24-madonsela-listed-among-times-100-most-influential-people; Madonsela Wins Global 
Award for Integrity, Mail & Guardian (Oct. 17, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-17-madonsela-
wins-integrity-award/; Samuel Mungadze, Madonsela Wins Woman of Substance Award, Bus. Day (Aug. 7, 
2015), http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/08/07/madonsela-wins-woman-of-substance-award.
154. See, e.g., Public Protector Needs Support in Face of Harsh Criticism: Cope, Times Live (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2015/08/05/Public-protector-needs-support-in-face-of-harsh-
criticism-Cope. 
155. See, e.g., Mtende Mhango, Public Protector’s Powers: What Law Says, The Sunday Indep. (Sept. 21, 
2014), http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/public-protector-s-powers-what-law-says-1.1753981#.
Vkgow9ap3wx.
156. See Pierre de Vos, Attacks on Madonsela: Blaming the Messenger, Constitutionally Speaking (July 8, 
2014), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/attacks-on-madonsela-blaming-the-messenger/ (responding 
to criticisms of the Public Protector by the ANC).
157. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(5).
158. See, e.g., Pub. Protector Annual Report 2004/2005, supra note 118, at 28.
159. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 182(1).
160. See, e.g., Pub. Protector Annual Report 2003/2004, supra note 103, at 6.
161. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(2).
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iV. dEMOCratiC aLLianCE V. sOUth afriCan brOadCasting COrpOratiOn
 The first opportunity for the courts to address this problem with respect to the 
Public Protector came when the official political opposition party, the Democratic 
Alliance, brought a suit demanding a court order that Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the Chief 
Operations Officer (COO) of the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC)—the government’s broadcaster—be immediately suspended.162 The 
Democratic Alliance based its claim on the Public Protector’s report into allegations 
of maladministration, systemic corporate governance deficiencies, and abuse of 
power by the COO, as well as a claim that the COO’s appointment by the Board of 
the SABC was irregular.163 While the Western Cape High Court ordered that 
Motsoeneng be suspended and that the SABC Board institute disciplinary 
proceedings against him,164 the court’s decision on the powers of the Public Protector 
has led to some confusion.165
 On the one hand, the court ruled that the decisions of the SABC Board and the 
Minister of Communications to ignore the recommendations of the Public Protector 
were irrational and therefore unconstitutional.166 On the other hand, Judge Ashton 
Schippers also held that the Public Protector’s findings are not directly binding and 
enforceable since they do not have the same legal status as court orders.167 Using the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court’s earlier decisions analogizing 
the Public Protector to the position of an ombudsman in other jurisdictions, Judge 
Schippers held that while the recommendations of the Public Protector are not 
binding, the government officials to whom they are directed are not free to disregard 
them based on their own conclusion but rather need to either implement them or 
provide rational reasons for refusing to do so.168 This decision, according to Judge 
Schippers, is an exercise of public power in its own right and would be subject to 
review by the courts, as would any decision by the Public Protector that may be 
challenged by those affected by the Public Protector’s findings or recommendations.169
 Both the ruling party and the Public Protector responded to the court’s decision 
by claiming that their positions had been vindicated.170 Since Motsoeneng has 
appealed the judgment, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal and possibly the 
162. Democratic All. v. S. African Broad. Corp. 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para. 1.
163. Id. at paras. 10, 20. 
164. Id. at para. 127.
165. See Franny Rabkin, News Analysis: Why the ANC and DA Claim Victory Over the Same Ruling, Bus. Day 
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/media/2014/10/28/news-analysis-why-the-anc-and-
da-claim-victory-over-the-same-ruling.
166. Democratic All., 2015 (1) SA 551 at para. 83.
167. See id. at para. 51.
168. See id. at paras. 66, 71.
169. Id. at paras. 71–73.
170. See Rabkin, supra note 165.
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Constitutional Court may have the chance to address this question.171 While the 
ruling party’s claim that the Public Protector’s recommendations are not binding 
may have been formally vindicated,172 this is a very narrow view of the court’s ruling 
and the role of the Public Protector in general. First, Judge Schippers made clear that 
the Public Protector’s recommendations may only be challenged before the courts if 
they are irrational and may only be disregarded by the public authorities subject to 
the Public Protector’s findings and recommendations if the authorities have “cogent 
reasons for doing so, that is for reasons other than merely a preference for its own 
view.”173 Second, the court argued that the decision whether or not to accept the 
Public Protector’s recommendation is an exercise of public power and thus must meet 
the minimum threshold requirement of rationality and that the principle of legality 
requires that any such decision “must be rationally related to the purpose for which 
the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary.”174 Finally, the court 
rejected the government’s argument that the Public Protector needs to seek the 
assistance of Parliament, to which the Public Protector is accountable, to implement 
the findings and recommendations of her investigations.175 Noting that it was the 
government that had refused without rational reasons to accept the findings or 
recommendations of the Public Protector, the court went on to point out that the 
intervention of the National Assembly is not an adequate remedy since “[t]he facts of 
this very case show that the constitutional and statutory provisions upon which they 
rely are inadequate to ensure that the Public Protector is not undermined.”176
 The result has been distinctly different interpretations of the court’s decision. 
Apart from the government and the Public Protector reaching different conclusions, 
academics and other commentators have also read different implications into the 
decision. Journalist Franny Rabkin reported on two differing commentators in 
particular: Mtende Mhango of the University of the Witwatersrand Law School and 
University of Cape Town law professor Pierre de Vos.177 According to Rabkin, 
Mhango relies on Judge Schippers’s analysis that the Public Protector is not an 
adjudicatory body and argues that the court “adopted English law, which distinguishes 
between the findings and recommendations of an ombudsman [so that] findings 
may be rejected only if there is a rational basis to do so” and that “recommendations 
are treated differently . . . and are not binding at all.”178 On the other hand, Rabkin 
reports that de Vos “interprets the judgment to say that, because of the obligation on 
171. See Motsoeneng Will Appeal Court Order for Suspension, Mail & Guardian (Oct. 28, 2014), http://
mg.co.za/article/2014-10-28-motsoeneng-will-appeal-his-suspension/.
172. See Democratic All., 2015 (1) SA 551 at paras. 51, 59; see also Rabkin, supra note 165. 
173. Democratic All., 2015 (1) SA 551 at para. 66.
174. Id. at para. 71.
175. See id. at paras. 59–62.
176. Id. at paras. 61–63. 
177. See Rabkin, supra note 165.
178. Id. 
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organs of state to ‘assist and protect’ the public protector, the threshold for rationality 
is set higher than usual,” and an organ of state may only legally “reject the view of the 
public protector . . . for ‘other, cogent reasons’—for example, if implementing the 
public protector’s remedial action is impossible.”179 At the same time, neither of these 
academics agrees with the interpretation put forward by the named litigant, the 
Democratic Alliance, whose Chairman, James Selfe, argued that the court’s decision 
means that before an organ of state can reject the recommendations of the Public 
Protector, it requires the approval of the courts.180
V. COnCLUsiOn
 It is this tension between the constitutional mandate that “[o]ther organs of state 
. . . must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity and effectiveness of these institutions”181 and the seeming inability of the 
Public Protector to ensure that the government addresses the institution’s findings 
and recommendations that lies at the heart of the separation of powers question left 
unresolved by the SABC judgment. While the court does note in defense of its own 
powers that “the rule of separation of powers cannot be used to avoid the obligation 
of a court to provide appropriate relief that is just and equitable to a litigant who 
successfully raises a constitutional complaint,”182 its decision to equate the Public 
Protector with the British ombudsman fails to acknowledge that the legislative 
authority of the ombudsman in the United Kingdom is legally distinct from the 
constitutional status enjoyed by the Chapter 9 institutions and the Public Protector 
in particular.183 Even if the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court 
179. Id. (quoting Pierre de Vos, What the High Court Really Said About the Powers of the Public Protector, 
Constitutionally Speaking (Oct. 26, 2014), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/what-the-high-
court-really-said-about-the-powers-of-the-public-protector/).
180. See id.
181. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(3).
182. Democratic All. v. S. African Broad. Corp. 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) at para. 99.
183. The United Kingdom has a range of different ombudspersons whose authority is determined by 
legislation and limited to resolving complaints. These ombudspersons are essentially an administrative 
complaints system and function as a form of alternative dispute resolution, have no legal authority to 
engage in their own investigations, and can only address complaints by investigating and negotiating 
with the relevant authority. It is thus not a surprise to learn that the English courts have not recognized 
them as having any power vis-à-vis either the executive or legislative branches of government. See 
generally Roy Gregory & Philip Giddings, The United Kingdom Parliamentary Ombudsman Scheme, in 
Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continents 21 (Roy Gregory & Philip Giddings eds., 
2000). Regardless of their status and even successful track record in tackling administrative blockages, 
the role of the Public Protector and other Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa is distinctively different. 
First, the Chapter 9 institutions have a constitutional status, and their status is not at the whim of the 
legislature even if they report on their activities and are in that sense accountable to the legislature. As 
independent constitutional institutions, they have a place in the creation and building of democracy in 
South Africa. While the exact space they work in is not yet clearly defined, and is even contested, the 
fact remains that they have a distinctive constitutional status. To that degree, they cannot be analogized 
to the standard form of ombudsperson and it is imperative that their exact place in the system of checks 
and balances that makes up the separation of powers be resolved.
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have analogized the Public Protector to an ombudsman institution,184 these courts 
have not reached a final decision but are now in the process of determining the 
precise role of the Chapter 9 bodies as “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy.” The difficulty in managing the relationship between the Public 
Protector and the government became acutely obvious when the Public Protector 
sought clarity over the official to whom she should submit her report on the 
expenditures on the President’s home at Nkandla, since the report was in part an 
investigation into benefits received by the President.185 The necessity of asking this 
question only served to highlight the more general question about the precise 
constitutional status of the Public Protector and the other Chapter 9 institutions. 
Even if we conceive of Chapter 9 as creating an additional branch of government, as 
I have argued, this does not resolve questions about the precise relationship of checks 
and balances that a separation of powers understanding requires. It is this challenge 
that remains an ongoing task for all who are committed to the building of a 
constitutional democracy in South Africa.
184. See Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para. 161; Pub. 
Protector v. Mail & Guardian Ltd. 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para. 9. 
185. See Secure in Comfort, supra note 42, at 426.
